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Applied to contemporary China, which is in manyways post-Confucian, the term “Confucianism” isboth essential and inadequate, as an analytical tool,
to any observer of Chinese society, and is in any case to be
used with caution. Initially coined by Westerners in order to
identify a set of discourses and practices specific to the
scholar-officials of the Empire, the word is frequently used in
descriptions of contemporary China. However, its usage is
not uniform, and refers at times to certain ideological perma-
nencies inherited from the Imperial period, and at others to
various attempts at reconstruction that, since the 1990s, have
appeared in the doctrinal elaboration of government, (1) in of-
ficial and semi-official educational discourse, (2) or in the eth-
ical sphere of everyday practice. (3)
We should note that while all these facts have something in
common, grouping them together under the same term can
distort perspective by excessive homogenisation. First of all,
the word “Confucianism” refers basically to two different or-
ders of reality: on the one hand, the phenomena related to
the Confucian fact, which is to say to the structural but not
necessarily formulated level that can be inferred from certain
(particularly political and family) constants specific to Chi-
nese society; and on the other, to the dynamics of identity —
for which we propose to reserve the term Confucianist in
order to distinguish them from the first group — characterised
by conscious, organised demands and mobilisations. Sec-
ondly, the term leads, according to how one perceives its om-
nipresence in analyses, to imagining in an equally excessive
way that “Confucianism” remains today a sort of “total social
fact”, enduring beyond the institutional differentiation be-
queathed by modernity, or conversely that it is now only a
residual notion, hovering like a “wandering ghost” (4) over
practices and institutions that, despite attempts at resurrec-
tion, have become fundamentally foreign to it. Consequently,
taking into consideration the various manifestations of “Con-
fucianism” at their true value in contemporary China re-
quires, without yielding to the effect of mass, to begin with
the diversity of practices that claim to be inspired by it and
the concrete configurations in which they are placed.
The problem is that the term acts as a screen. “Confucian-
ism” is indeed too vast, or too vague, to designate what in
modern Chinese immediately breaks down into “rujia” (a
fairly general term that does duty for “Confucian school”),
as well as into “ruxue” (“Confucian study or studies”) and
“rujiao” (“Confucian religion”), to which must be added the
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Our thanks to Vincent Goossaert and Sébastien Billioud for their careful reading of
this article and for the valuable suggestions they were kind enough to give us. Any
flaws that remain are of course entirely our own. This article is part of an interna-
tional research project supported by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation and entitled
“The Confucian Revival in Mainland China: Forms and Meanings of Confucian Piety
Today”.
1. Cf. Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianisme, ‘tradition culturelle‘ et discours officiels
dans la Chine des années 2000” (Confucianism, “cultural tradition” and official dis-
courses in China at the start of the new century), Perspectives chinoises, 
n° 2007 / 3, pp. 53-68.
2. Cf. Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “Jiaohua: le renouveau confucéen en
Chine comme projet éducatif” (Jiaohua: the Confucian revival in China as an 
educative project), Perspectives chinoises, 2007 / 4, pp. 4-21; Ji Zhe, “Éduquer par
la musique. De l’“Initiation des enfants à la musique classique” à la “culture de
soi” confucéenne des étudiants” (Educating through music. From an 'initiation into
classical music' for children to Confucian self-cultivation for university students), 
Perspectives chinoises, n° 2008 / 3, pp. 118-129.
3. Cf. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Chang-
ing Society, Princeton University Press, 2008.
4. According to the expression of Yu Yingshi, Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang
(Modern Confucianism: Retrospective and Perspective), Beijing, Sanlian shudian,
2004, pp. 53-58; 262-270.
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The multiplicity of initiatives in China today that claim to be inspired by “Confucianism” calls for particular attention to
the diversity of their practical application. In this case study, we analyse the formation and workings of a new kind of
educational institution: initiated three years ago in the town of Tangchi (Anhui) by a Taiwanese Buddhist, but
nonetheless strongly influenced by Confucian traditionalism, this “Cultural Education Centre” is inventing, somewhere
between political control and moral proselytism, a new form of governmentality that could gain widespread acceptance.
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components “xueshu” (academic), “guanfang” (official),
and “minjian” (popular) — without forgetting the inventive-
ness of the actors themselves in their practice of self-defini-
tion. There is here a range of notions that are related and in
practice often intertwined, but which from the actors’ point
of view seem noticeably distinct. (5) This diffracted character-
istic of Chinese terminology deserves to be taken seriously.
In it is manifest the specifically plural dimension of the
“Confucian revival,” which, far from being an optical effect,
lies at the very heart of contemporary representations.
Therefore, while the increasingly numerous promoters of
“traditional culture” do not themselves take Confucianism as
a cohesive entity, the observer must be attentive to the dy-
namics of polarisation that lead them to identify themselves
not only in a dialectical relation to other current references
(Buddhism, Taoism, Western modernisation), but also, very
frequently, through logics of internal differentiation. (6) Thus
only a preliminary analysis of the complexity of the dynam-
ics at work makes possible a full understanding of the global
phenomena that characterise this field of culturalist de-
mands. One will see in particular that the concomitance and
the networking of the various movements are a major factor
in the tendency of contemporary “Confucianism” to gener-
ate a form of unanimity — which favours both its political in-
strumentalisation and its potential role in the logics of social
integration.
It is with this analytical framework that we here approach a
specific case of “Confucianist revival.” Located in Tangchi, a
town in the south of Anhui Province where we carried out field
work in November 2007, (7) this is in fact still a relatively iso-
lated case, but it is indicative of the potential for the insertion
of Confucianist themes into new political-cultural constructions.
Tangchi is one of 17 towns in the district of Lujiang. It is of
fairly modest size, with a population of 48,000 spread over
the town itself and a dozen villages. While the economy of the
district is far from flourishing, it nonetheless made possible in
2007 an average income of 3,587 yuan, according to official
statistics. (8) An unremarkable rural district three years ago, Lu-
jiang today has become the location of an unusual enterprise,
the implementation of which, symbolised by a complex of
buildings that are relatively impressive in such a context, in-
volves more than 400 people, and wields increasing influence
both locally and nationally. Every six months, it receives a
class of 30 teachers who are trained according to the criteria
of “traditional culture.” This change is due to the initiative of
a Taiwanese Buddhist monk, the Venerable Master Jingkong
(Chin-Kung), who was born in February 1927 in the neigh-
bouring town of Jinniu under the name Xu Yehong, and who
in 2005 became the founder of the present-day “Lujiang Cul-
tural Education Centre” (Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin). 
This fairly spectacular development of an originally Buddhist
enterprise may seem surprising at first, given the general sus-
picion the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to
display towards initiatives of a religious nature, especially
when they originate from outside the People’s Republic.
The Lujiang Centre is registered as “minban feiqiye dan-
wei” (a non-entrepreneurial unit managed by the people), a
category that the Chinese state legalised in 1998 in order to
regulate non-profit NGOs, including certain private schools.
A question that arises immediately is the means of legalisa-
tion: by what kinds of official or tacit exchanges and accord-
ing to what means of interaction was such an initiative able
to gain the support of the local government? One is also
tempted to question the aims and the actual nature of the
“education” practised by Jingkong’s disciples. Not only does
the Centre put forward a number of Confucianist virtues
(the first of which is “filial piety,” xiao) as doctrinal refer-
ences, but its members hold in high esteem the “harmonious
society” preached by Hu Jintao: should one not therefore
immediately consider this establishment to be a new means
of social control, the traditionalist tendency of which could
only be in harmony with the imperatives of stable govern-
ment?
In this ambiguous field, where the discourse of legitimation
and the strategies of instrumentalisation seem to overlap, two
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5. While “rujia” designates Confucianism from the angle of what characterises it in partic-
ular in contrast with other “schools” or traditions, “ruxue” emphasises the intellectual
dimension, without necessarily excluding ethical repercussions, while “rujiao” is a mod-
ern category aimed at identifying in Confucianism a “religious” component (deduced by
analogy with Western religions) that historically led to the institutionalisation of the wor-
ship of Confucius and to the rituals that were — or still are — associated with it. Con-
cerning the impact of the Western notion of “religion” on Confucianism at the end of the
Empire, cf. Hsi-Yuan Chen, Confucian Encounters with “Religion”: Rejections, Appropri-
ations, and Transformations, London, Routledge, forthcoming. On the distinction be-
tween popular Confucianism and official Confucianism, cf. Philip Clart, “Confucius and
the Mediums: Is there a “Popular Confucianism?” T’oung Pao 89 (1-3), 2003, pp. 1-38.
For an analysis of the intellectual discourses stemming from “ruxue” in Taiwan and in
the People’s Republic and of their links with cultural nationalism, cf. John Makeham,
Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse, Harvard Uni-
versity Asia Center, 2008.
6. In today’s university circles, it is frequent to see proponents of a modernised and de-
mocratised “Confucian study” (ruxue), or of a “Confucian school” (rujia), with its own
voice in the concert of philosophical nations, who have little esteem for the avatars of
the “Confucian religion” (rujiao), while upholders of the latter are suspicious of the ex-
cesses of a “popular Confucianism” (minjian rujia or minjian rujiao) that is inclined to
see itself as the guardian of an authenticity it denies to “academic Confucianism”
(xueshu ruxue).
7. This field work was carried out by Guillaume Dutournier with the collaboration of Wang
Yuchen, a doctoral candidate in anthropology at Beijing Normal University, whom we
would like to thank for her enthusiasm and great competence. Our thanks also go to the
Ateliers Doctoraux de Beijing (and in particular to their director, Jean-Louis Rocca),
whose awarding of a field bursary made this research possible.
8. Average annual income for Chinese rural areas in 2007 was 4,410 yuan.
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traps must be avoided. The first would be
to overestimate the alibi value of the
“Confucianist” discourse in this Buddhist
education programme; the second would
be to posit some sort of Machiavellian di-
mension to its instrumentalisation by the
local government. In fact, the centring of
the discourse on traditional virtues, far
from being a mere façade, substantially
hinges on a coherent corpus of references and practices in
which a range of actors, in the course of the process, eventu-
ally have their interests satisfied. Consequently, rather than ap-
proaching the elaboration of the Lujiang Cultural Education
Centre in terms of construction — as the rational creation of an
organ of proselytism or discipline — it is the formation (9) of an
institution of a particular kind that we will focus on here, in the
sense of a conjunctural process whose deeper stakes remain
largely invisible to the actors themselves.
Moreover, this process proves to be remarkably heteroge-
neous, to the point that the notion of “popular Confucian-
ism,” although useful for describing it, expresses its complex-
ity only imperfectly. It is therefore more as a singular disposi-
tif that we will analyse the Lujiang Centre — in other words,
as a composite formula based on both a “Confucianist” dis-
course and on certain Buddhist practices, on a popular dy-
namic and on official support, on moral teaching and on
moralisation techniques — in short, as Michel Foucault puts
it, on “the spoken as well as (on) the unspoken.” (10) We seek
to show that it is precisely the practical effectiveness of such
an assembly that explains the relative stability of the estab-
lishment of the Lujiang Centre over the course of three
years and despite its experimental character, while at the
same time making it possible to envision future expansion.From internat ional  Buddhismto “tradit ional  culture”
A fundamentally collective enterprise, the Lujiang Cultural
Education Centre links its own origins to the determination
of a single individual. Extensively propagated in the publica-
tions that issue from it, the biography of the monk Jingkong
appears de facto as a central means of legitimation. 
However, while the religious virtues of its founder appear in
the symbolic construction of the Centre, they do not lead to
Buddhist proselytism any more than they place the monk at
the head of its real functioning.
Born into an apparently comfortable family, Xu Yehong
began his studies in Nanjing before fleeing to Taiwan with
the Kuomintang. (11) A sign of his family’s close ties with the
nationalist party is that he first worked there in a military
training organisation. It was during this period that he first
made the acquaintance of the neo-Confucian philosopher
Fang Dongmei (1899-1977), then a professor at the Univer-
sity of Taiwan, at whose suggestion he embraced the study
of philosophy and Buddhism. Influenced by this encounter
and others, (12) Xu had himself tonsured in February 1959, at
the age of 32, in the Linji Temple in Yuanshan (Taipei),
thus becoming Master Jingkong. In the 1960s and 70s, he
carried out various duties in the Buddhist Association of the
Republic of China (BAROC), where he began to show an
interest in the Pure Land school (Jingtu). (13) In 1977, he
took on the task of promoting Buddhism among the overseas
Chinese, then emigrated to the United States, where he
founded the “Dallas Buddhist Association” in 1985. Three
years later, he pursued his activity of spreading Buddhism in
Southeast Asia (in particular Singapore). In 2001, he fo-
cused on Australia, especially Queensland, where he
founded the Pure Land Learning College, the institution
where he now spends most of his time.
While highly active abroad, Jingkong was not absent from
the field of proselytism in mainland China, where Buddhism
began to experience rebirth in the 1980s. In 1985, assisted
by the layman Jian Fengwen, he set up the Foundation for
Buddhist Education in Taiwan, which from 1989 to 1995
printed an edition of the Buddhist Canon (Dazangjing)
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9. We here use the distinction made by Jean-François Bayart in L’Illusion identitaire (The
Illusion of identity), Paris, Fayard, 1996, p. 13.
10. We borrowed this concept of « dispositif » from Michel Foucault; cf., in particular, “Le
jeu de Michel Foucault” (1977), Dits et Écrits II (Sayings and Writings II) (edited by D. De-
fert and F. Ewald), Paris, Gallimard, 2001, p. 299.
11. The biographical details given here come from what can be gleaned about Jingkong’s
career from the website of the Pure Land Learning College, (www.amtb-aus.org, visited
on October 3, 2008).
12. At that time Jingkong was also influenced by the teachings of the Seventh “Reincar-
nated Lama of Inner Mongolia” (Cangjia Kutuqtu, 1891-1978), and of the lay Buddhist Li
Bingnan (1890-1986), who were also refugees on the island.
13. A Buddhist tradition aimed more at the popular sphere than at erudite speculation, the
“Pure Land” school sees in the recitation of the name of Buddha Amitabha the surest
way to obtain eternal life in the “Western Paradise” (or “Pure Land”), which is Buddha’s
Kingdom.
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Presentation of Jingkong 
from the brochure of the Centre
© Guillaume Dutournier
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aimed at a number of mainland institutions. He also reached
a wide audience through the distribution of his lectures in
printed and audiovisual form, so that by the end of the
1990s the Venerable Master Jingkong was widely known on
the mainland, (14) where he appeared as an influential figure
in contemporary Buddhism. 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, Jingkong has par-
ticipated in several international conferences on intercultural
and religious dialogue, which he states have made him aware
of the problem of cultural diversity. This experience seems to
have played a decisive role in a process of self-redefinition
from simple monk to representative of Chinese culture in gen-
eral, the latter being relabelled, in contrast with other cul-
tures, as a tradition that singularly emphasises the values of
“tolerance.” However, in an interview dating from 2006, (15)
Jingkong also acknowledges that his successive participation
in five UN peace conferences and three international sym-
posia finally made him aware of the futility of such meetings,
which he sees as lacking any transformative power, despite
their good intentions. It was therefore as a result of his ac-
tivism in the promotion of Buddhism, as well as his disap-
pointment with international organisations, that he decided to
apply the resources of tolerance in Chinese culture by con-
ceiving the prototype of a microsociety where cultural diver-
sity and mutual understanding would be real. We should note
that at this stage, the reference to “chuantong wenhua” (tra-
ditional Chinese culture) is still conceived only as an opening
towards a horizon that was claimed as “multicultural.”
After an aborted initial attempt in the United States, he
thought about settling in Singapore before the price of real
estate turned out to be an obstacle to the large-scale proj-
ect planned. He then turned to Australia, to the town of
Toowoomba in Queensland, but was soon discouraged by
what he perceived as a virtual absence of religious feeling
among the Australians. Finally, it was on returning to his
native region, in the district of Lujiang, that he finally
found a propitious place to set up: openly sharing his proj-
ect with the local authorities, he was pleased by a
favourable reception that allowed him to found the “Lu-
jiang Multicultural Education Centre” (Lujiang duoyuan
wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin) at a cost of 70 million yuan in
November 2005. Initially renting some buildings from the
local government, the organisation acquired a purpose-built
infrastructure at the end of 2006 (a building for teaching
and offices, two others for dormitories, and another for var-
ious functions), and expanded by building facilities for
teaching next door, with various annexes spread around the
town (in particular a canteen open to residents, as well as
several hectares of land cultivated by members). Total ex-
penses of 220 million yuan were paid entirely by private
contributions from Southeast Asia as well as from Taiwan
and the mainland. (16)
As far as conjunctural and personal factors are concerned,
one can here put forward some hypotheses on the particular
circumstances that seem to have facilitated the establishment
in Tangchi of the centre planned by Jingkong.
One should first of all note the consistency with which, from
the 1990s, Jingkong was a benefactor to both Buddhist and
lay institutions of his native district (donations of a Buddhist
Canon to the Temple of Fuhu on first returning to the main-
land in 1997, of about a hundred computers to Lujiang High
School, and also, a year later, the sum of 100,000 yuan to
the high school’s new library); there is no doubt but that
these repeated marks of solicitude gradually led the local
government to regard Jingkong as a benefactor before facili-
tating the realisation of his project. On this subject, we
should add that, whether because of monkish prudence or of
a condition imposed by the government, the honorific title of
“Venerable Master” (fashi) no longer accompanies official
references to Jingkong: his name is now simply preceded by
the (respectful but considerably less Buddhist) formula of
“Old Professor” (lao jiaoshou) — a title that is nonetheless
justified by the numerous university degrees accumulated by
Jingkong as an actor in international Buddhism. This is not
the only unclear aspect regarding the religious theme: the
monk Jingkong has proved to be a very unobtrusive partner
for local government. While he is symbolically present in the
Centre (in particular through numerous displayed portraits,
in which he poses in his monk’s robes), most of the time he
is physically absent, with all the administrative duties being
de facto delegated (apparently from the outset) to two lay
Taiwanese disciples, Mrs. Yang Shufen and Mr. Cai
Lixu, (17) who head the establishment as Vice President and
Head of Education, respectively. The discretion of the
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14. Cf. He Yun, “Jingkong fashi fangwen ji” (Interview with Master Jingkong), Fojiao wen-
hua, n° 4, 1999, p. 4-7.
15. This interview, along with others, is part of a set of DVDs entitled Hexie zhengjiu weiji
(Harmony Solves The Crisis), distributed in 2008 by the Centre for Buddhist Cultural Re-
search in Beijing and the Guanghua Temple.
16. Among the contributors, a Mr. Lai, a Singapore Chinese, seems to be an emblematic fig-
ure. Presented as the first important donor to the Centre, he is said to have contributed
80 million yuan to its launching. This sum came partly from the legacy of his father, to
whom the benefactor wished to pay tribute by this gesture.
17. Yang Shufen, a native of Taiwan, began promoting “traditional education” in 1990 in Tai-
wan and among the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In 2003 she turned to the mainland,
where with her disciple Cai Lixu, a primary school teacher and fellow disciple of
Jingkong, she founded a “Xiaolian Centre for Initiation into National Studies” at Haikou
(on the island of Hainan), which promotes the spreading of Confucian morality among
the young.
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founder and the intermediate role of his
assistants thus spare government cadres,
who are sometimes involved in the activ-
ities of the Centre, from direct contact
with an individual with explicit religious
attributes.
Lastly, from the point of view of a local
government with statutory duties in the
relaying of official propaganda, the
monk’s career presents a symbolic ad-
vantage that could only favour his ac-
ceptance, which is the retargeting of the initial multicultural
objective exclusively to traditional Chinese culture. The orig-
inal name (the Lujiang Multicultural Education Centre) re-
ferred to Jingkong’s initial endeavours, all of which were car-
ried out in the international Buddhist network outside of
China. However, once it was transplanted to Tangchi, in the
heart of rural China, the initial horizon of cultural diversity
seems to have lost much of its relevance in the eyes of its
promoters. This change led — by the simple removal of the
adjective “duoyuan” from the name — to a fairly radical re-
orientation of the aims of the Centre. Although an adapta-
tion to the sociocultural conditions of the new site rather
than submission to any pressure on the part of the authori-
ties, this change could nonetheless only resonate with the
nationalistic tone of official propaganda.“Cultural  educat ion”:C ivi l i s ing  practices  and thediscourse  o f  practi ce
Educational  community or  di sc ipl inaryinsti tut ion?
Despite its local links, the Lujiang Cultural Education Cen-
tre is strongly connected, both symbolically and practically,
with national issues. While its influence manifests itself
above all within the perimeters of the town and the district,
its students are recruited at the national level and are des-
tined to eventually become “seed-professors” spread
throughout society. Similarly, the “culture” that figures in the
name of the establishment immediately places the Lujiang
Centre in the vast area of “traditional culture”: the virtually
exclusive use of non-simplified characters in the textual pro-
duction of the Centre is a clear proclamation of this sym-
bolic union. However, the objective declared here is remark-
able above all for its ambition: it is a matter, neither more
nor less, of contributing to the transformation of Chinese so-
ciety by the work of collective moralisation, based on the re-
activation of “tradition” and promoted by an exemplary elite.
The resources brought to bear for this are remarkably exten-
sive: an expensive structure, the Centre aims to be both a
space for the “training” (peiyang) of an avant-garde and an
open and influential place, for the “promotion” (hongyang)
of traditional culture. Here, as in other comparable cases,
the project of “cultural education” means that one seeks to
“train trainers”, that is to say, to change oneself as much as
to change others. (18) In practice, this latter aspect primarily
concerns the residents of the town, who are systematically
invited to enter a process of “self-cultivation” (xiuyang or
xiushen) that is meant to be incumbent on everyone.
As an “educational” establishment that is both private and
local, the Lujiang Centre presents the twofold particularity
of committing itself to a cause of a civilising kind — which
distinguishes it from the purely technical training in the pri-
vate education sector — and of doing this in plain sight and
presenting itself as already institutionalised or in the process
of becoming so — which distances it from other more dis-
creet forms of renewal of “traditional education.” The flag-
raising that takes places every week in the presence of local
cadres is the most obvious mark of this relationship with the
official sphere. 
We shall see, however, that this is a complex relationship, a
mixture of dependence, unconscious imitation, and diver-
sion.
This aspect shows above all in the method of recruiting stu-
dents, which at first glance strongly resembles what would
prevail in an adult education establishment. Thus, in Novem-
ber 2005, the Lujiang education centre (which was then still
“multicultural”) launched for the first time a call for applica-
tions all over the country with a view to training “the teach-
ers of moral education that today’s society so urgently
needs.” (19) The requirements of this campaign included
Flag-raising inside 
the Centre of Lujiang
© Guillaume Dutournier
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18. Cf. Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, art. cit., pp. 16-18. 
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moral qualities as much as institutionally validated qualifica-
tions (studies and professional experience). (20) This indicates
that the Centre does not offer a substitute course but rather
training complementary to existing courses: the “professors”
it recruits are already teachers trained in the official system.
During this first campaign, 30 people  — most around the age
of thirty — were selected for a six-month training course from
among the 300 candidates who answered the call. While the
course does not lead to a fully certified diploma, the “profes-
sors” who benefit from it often associate their arrival at the
Centre with a break in their personal career: in some cases
they even acquire a determination to substantially prolong
their stay. (21) By the end of 2007, there had been four classes
of this kind, which brought to more than 100 the number of
such “professors” trained by the Centre.
What are the skills taught in this unusual institution? While
there is a kind of book learning dispensed in lecture mode,
the major portion of the training lies in an overall process
made up of classes and personal study, and above all com-
munity practice, which serves both as context and field of
application. Thus, the life of the “professors” trained at
Tangchi is precisely regulated, and not only — as is the case
in many contemporary Chinese institutions — in terms of life
rhythms (regulated times for meals that are taken commu-
nally, training schedules posted on notice boards, various
ceremonies that all are required to attend), but also on the
level of daily interaction, on which a particular etiquette
makes its mark: every time they pass each other inside or
outside the establishment, or when they meet any individual
outside, members are expected to stop and make a strictly
codified salutation (jugong) as a sign of mutual respect. (22)
Moreover, the Centre practises strict vegetarianism, makes
sleeping in dormitories compulsory, and restricts comings
and goings, in particular at night. Lastly, while expressions
of love are forbidden in accordance with the rule that — how-
ever theoretically  — still prevails on many Chinese cam-
puses, (23) the Centre displays an extremely radical sign of
severance from contemporary society: mobile phones are for-
bidden. Thus, it is not mere training that the Cultural Edu-
cation Centre offers, but also a genuine mental and physical,
individual and collective discipline.
This ritualisation of community life also includes external ap-
pearance, with members differentiating themselves immedi-
ately from the other inhabitants of the village by means of
special clothes that serve as markers of the three statuses de-
fined by the Centre. These statuses correspond to different
responsibilities and pay levels. A sleeveless red or blue
smock indicates in the former case that the member is part
of the maintenance personnel (made up of volunteers,
yigong, recruited according to very wide-ranging criteria  —
qualified or unqualified students, local retirees  — for varying
lengths of time) or in the latter that the member is one of
those who have been selected for training (and who are paid
a few hundred yuan a month). The third group (that of Cai
Lixu and Yang Shufen) is distinguished by the wearing of a
grey collarless jacket of a more traditional cut that immedi-
ately identifies them as set apart in the community: these are
a few “professors” who as real cadres of the institution are
subject to a special recruitment and are in charge of teach-
ing and administration at the Centre.
Consequently, while one finds practices in the functioning of
the Centre that are reminiscent of existing educational insti-
tutions, its asceticism makes it to some extent more like a
form of lay monastery. For all that, the discipline that char-
acterises it does not make it a real disciplinary structure, or
even a total institution in Goffman’s sense, (24) to the extent
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19. For a presentation of the criteria for recruitment to the Centre and of its activities, cf. Wu
Haiyun, “Xuanxiao xianshi de “taoyuan” jingtu” (The Pure Land of a “shelter” in this
deafening world), Fenghuang zhoukan, 2007, n° 15; text on line: http://www.ifeng.com/
phoenixtv/73024099118481408/20070710/908307.shtml (visited on 3 October 2008).
20. While a “basic knowledge of traditional culture” and proof of “upright behaviour” are de-
manded, also required are at least three years’ teaching experience (this includes
kindergartens), as well as, for those under 36, a core university degree and, for those
between 37 and 45, a technical degree.
21. The management states that half the students in the class of 2005 chose to remain in
the Centre after their training, apparently in most cases for more detailed learning.
22. Hands held against the stomach, with the right hand over the left, inclination of the chest
90° towards the front: this position to be held motionless for three seconds.
23. These similarities with ordinary educational institutions should not make us forget that
in this case the “students” are adults: it is thus celibacy that the interdiction of amorous
relations de facto imposes on those who are not yet married (these apparently being the
majority). Moreover, while the principle of equality among members is put forward, the
women are subject to additional rules: no hair colour or loose hair; no high heels or col-
larless or sleeveless clothes.
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Salutation between a member of the Centre 
and a young resident of the town.
© Guillaume Dutournier
Social experimentation and “popular Confucianism”
that the Centre remains open to the outside world  — begin-
ning with the village of Tangchi, which seems to be its natu-
ral deployment space. Its majestic architectural visibility,
closed in with walls and guarded gates, does indeed mark a
separation, but its members are all volunteers and identify
with the cause of the Centre: while many remain involved be-
yond the six-month training, they are free to continue their ac-
tivity there or to stop. In this regard, while it is difficult to
have a clear idea of the question of breaking the rules of the
Centre (guiding), one can assume that outright infringement
would lead to sanctions, and even to expulsion from the com-
munity. However, again this is only the consequence of mem-
bers voluntarily embracing a collective discipline whose pri-
mary aim is to serve as the means of individual self-culture.
Thus the Centre’s dynamic is not a function but fundamen-
tally a work: its aim is not to train and supervise a collective,
but to forge a community. All in all, while there is real in-
volvement of the official sphere, it is essential to the effec-
tiveness of the Centre that its institutionalisation not be total,
in order for it to remain a place where, ideally, individual de-
cision energises the collective and not the other way round.
A case  of  “popular Confucianism”?  The  pr imacy of  pract ice
While the Centre asserts its communal dimension through a
body of rules, it also does so by promoting a coherent doc-
trine. Without aiming for highly developed theoretical elab-
orations, this leads the members of the Centre to use a sim-
ilar discourse, which borrows its essential theoretical frame-
work from the traditional Confucian virtues. In fact, accord-
ing to a recently published brochure, the Centre aligns its
pedagogy “on the teaching contents linked to the eminent
traditional culture of China, in particular on fundamental
principles of the ‘Way of respecting one’s parents (xiaodao)’
and of the ‘Way of respecting one’s teachers (shidao)’” ; to
these doctrinal pillars are added equally Confucian virtues:
“filial piety, loyalty, and honesty” (xiaoti zhongxin), “polite-
ness, sense of justice, and of shame” (liyi liangchi), and
“goodwill and serenity” (ren’ai heping). (25) Thus despite the
fact that its founder was a Buddhist, it appears that the “cul-
tural education” practised at the Centre is, at least on the
level of terminology, typically “Confucianist.”
However, in order to be specified, this ideological content has
to be related to its usage within the field of culturalist de-
mands. Here, as in other comparable cases, it is the notion of
“popular Confucianism” that is brought to bear. Indeed, the
actors at the Centre specifically formulate their rejection of
“academic” discourse (xueshu) on Confucianism, its objective
demands (scientificity and exhaustivity) being accused of
compromising any authentic relation to culture, and funda-
mentally of being an obstacle to its “putting into practice” 
(luoshi). This opposition often appears in the form of an in-
genious semantic inversion through which the Centre’s mem-
bers deny belonging to “ruxue” (“Confucian study”), the bet-
ter to assert their attachment to “xueru” (26) (which substitutes
a verbal dynamism for the original noun; the expression can
be translated as “effective application of Confucian study”).
Far from being trivial, the popularity of this word game in
Tangchi effectively reveals the divisions in the “Confucian re-
vival.” Moreover, while it shows the primacy of “practice” in
the pedagogy of the Centre, it is also an indication of the fun-
damental importance of discourse in this primacy. The fact is
that the “popular Confucianism” of Lujiang is no less produc-
tive of discourse than the erudite Confucianism of academics;
however it is so in a particular mode, based on specific textual
references and rhetoric. Indeed, while all movements that
claim to be part of “popular Confucianism” share a distrust of
the academic field, it is expressed differently in each case.
Thus on the question — which is absolutely central in histor-
ical Confucianism — of the canonical texts, the actors of the
Centre favour an option that may seem minimalist compared
with the choices made by other “popular Confucianism”
movements. From the wide range of Confucian classics, they
use only one very short text, which moreover is known as
one of the few “classics for children”: the Dizigui (Rules for
Disciples). (27) Comprised of 1,000 characters, this work,
which is typical of child education in the mid-Qing Dy-
nasty, is divided into short chapters, each based on suc-
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24. For a definition of the concept of the “total institution” (which is inappropriate in this
case), see Erving Goffman, Asiles. Études sur la condition sociale des malades mentaux
(Asylums : Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates) (trad. L.
Lainé), Paris, Minuit, “Le sens commun,” 1968, pp. 41-54. 
25. Cf. Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin, Hexie shehui, Liyi jiabang: Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu
zhongxin (Harmonious Society, The land where ritual and justice reign: The Lujiang Cul-
tural Education Centre) (undated), p. 2.
26. Cai Lixu replied as follows to a journalist who asked him if he saw himself as a “con-
temporary Confucian scholar”: “We are not followers of ‘ruxue,’ but of ‘xueru.’ We take
Confucian culture in order to apply it with our whole body (shenti lixing): we do not make
it into research (yanjiu).” Cf. “‘Xueru,’ er bu shi ‘ruxue‘” (“Xueru,” not “ruxue”), in Minzhu
yu fazhi shibao, 2007, n° 30, A02.
27. Before it was renamed by a certain Jia Cunren at the end of the Qing Dynasty, the Dizigui
was called Xunmengwen (Teachings for the Early Learning of Children), the title given it
by its first compiler, Li Yuxiu (1662-1722). For an overview of children’s literature in the
Chinese tradition, cf. Xu Zi, Mengxue duwu de lishi toushi (Historical perspective on
books for the education of children), Wuhan, Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995; for a short
presentation of the Dizigui, cf. Bai Limin, Shaping the ideal child, Hong Kong, The Chi-
nese University Press, 2005, p. 81; for a detailed study see Lin Yuhuang, “Dizigui
chutan” (A First Approach to The Dizigui), text on line at: http://web.nutn.edu.tw/chi-
nese/%E6%96%B0%E8%B3%87%E6%96% 99%E5%A4%BE/%E5%BC%9F%E5%
AD%90%E8%A6%8F/index.htm (visited on 18 August 2008).
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  Fea tu re
cessive segments of the same passage from the
Analects, (28) the moral and ritual implications of which
are expanded in trisyllabic and rhymed form. While this
opuscule has been totally excluded from modern official
education, (29) this has not prevented it, over the last ten
years, from returning to favour with the growth, in Taiwan
and then in China, of the “movement for the reading of
the classics by children” (ertong dujing yundong), (30)
which, as is the case in Tangchi, also actually reaches
adults. 
Despite its simplicity and concision, the justification of
the Dizigui as a totalising Confucian classic that can be
substituted for all the others is here inseparable from a
discourse of insistence on practice. Indeed, the aim of
“cultural education” is not to encourage exhaustive study
of the various existing classics, but rather to accede to an
essential intuition, the possession of which is supposed to
provide the key to all moral action. In this regard, the
brevity of the text and its quintessential character
(Jingkong speaks of it in terms of “root of the root” of the
classics) appear as the very condition of internal progress.
The connection between this fundamental status attrib-
uted to a short text and the discourse on practice appears
in these words of Jingkong:
The Great Way of which the Confucians speak is to
be found in its entirety in the Dizigui. I tell the stu-
dents that there is to be found the root of sacred
study. Knowing how to read it, knowing it by heart is
no use. It has to be applied! Each phrase, each char-
acter has to be put into practice. Succeeding in not
departing from it at any moment in life, from the be-
ginning of study until death, succeeding in abiding by
that, that alone is really “studying.” (31)
The other aspect of the discourse on practice concerns its
rhetorical application. While lectures take up a consider-
able part of training at the Centre, they do not much re-
semble those that take place in an ordinary education
structure. Here again, the institutional model (in this case
the classroom) is diverted towards a very different prag-
matic situation. During our research, the Centre offered
over several days a series of “lectures” on the theme of fil-
ial piety, (32) which several professors (some of whom had
been specially invited for the occasion) delivered to
trainees, but also to residents of the village. The organis-
ers of the session pointed out to us that these lecturers
were chosen not so much for their qualifications as for
their ability to communicate to a mixed audience their
personal experience in matters of family and social
morality. Here the public speaking skills highlight the
life story of the speaker and his role as a witness, indeed
as a model, aiming to pass on a truth presented as ac-
cessible to all because of its strong self-evidence. From
this point of view, the theme of “filial piety” is not cho-
sen at random. It consists in promoting an attitude of re-
spect towards one’s parents that is endowed, in the Chi-
nese context no doubt even more than anywhere, with a
strong supposition of naturalness. Now the paradox here
is that this naturalness is not, so to speak, self-evident:
conceived as innate, but also as precarious and under
threat, moral affection has to be kept alive if it is not to
disappear. In other words, the effectiveness of this rhet-
oric of the evident depends on a supposition: that it is
necessary, generation after generation, to carry on a tra-
dition of the natural. This being so, the discourse seeks
to be a progression (a trace or incitement) towards
awareness, just as the audience is no longer a mere re-
ceiver, but an actor in the work of self-recovery, after
which it is supposed — under this rhetorical relationship
— to rediscover its fundamental dispositions in their en-
tirety.
One can see it in this example: the collective and performa-
tive dimension of the Centre’s pedagogy is far from being re-
stricted to its members alone, since it seeks to address itself
to all the inhabitants of the village. To this end, the actors
use a discourse that is also conveyed into action through a
range of practices, techniques, and individual validations that
make up the effectiveness of a dispositif — without it being
possible to say who is in control.
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28. “The Master said, ‘A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful to his
elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate
the friendship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the performance of
these things, he should employ them in polite studies’” (Analects of Confucius, I.6, trans.
Legge). This is how the Dizigui comments the very beginning of this passage: “Father
and mother call (you)/Answer without delay/Father and mother order (you)/Act without
laziness/ Father and mother teach (you)/Listen with respect/Father and mother scold
(you)/Say nothing and accept (…). These commentaries draw in large part on the “Qili”
chapter of the Liji, as well as from neo-Confucian texts of the Song and Ming Dynasties,
in particular by Zhu Xi and Huang Zongxi.
29. Conversely, it is said to have been promoted by some local authorities in the Imperial
period. Cf. Xu Zi, op. cit., p. 110.
30. Cf. Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, art. cit., p. 16.
31. Ruhe luoshi dexing jiaoyu jiangxi shouce. Neibu xuexi ziliao (Handbook on moral teach-
ing and on the question of its practice. Internal study document), Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu
zhongxin, 2006, p. 29.
32. This series of lectures also took place in 2006, although probably in another form. One
publication shows traces of it: Yang Shufen, Dizigui jiangjie, Beijing dafang guang wen-
hua gongyibu (undated).
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Social experimentation and “popular Confucianism”
A social  experiment betweenpol it i ca l  control  and moralnorms
From its beginnings, the Centre was conceived, not as a pha-
lanstery jealously guarding an elite closed off from the world,
but as a kernel of real social experimentation that aimed at
extending itself. It is therefore both from the perspective of
“Confucian” proselytism carried on by the Centre, and in its
twofold relationship with government (the symbolic link with
government ideology and its functional relationship with the
local authorities) that we must understand the elaboration
and the dynamic of its relations with the outside.
“Harmonious  soci ety” :  from s logan tosoc ia l  exper iment
In February 2005, not long before Jingkong founded the
Centre, Hu Jintao launched his new slogan of “harmonious
socialist society” (shehuizhuyi hexie shehui). During the
Sixth plenary session of the Central Committee of the 16th
Congress of the CCP (November 2006), a “Resolution of
the Central Committee on some major stakes in the con-
struction of a harmonious society” was passed, which made
this “construction” the major task at the time. While this slo-
gan is not really the first example of a Confucian-inspired
line in the history of post-Maoist China, (33) it nevertheless
translates a determination to come out of the modernist
scheme through a more directly organic objective that also
reveals the growing preoccupation of the Chinese leadership
in the face of escalating social tensions in the country. More-
over, one can consider that, while symbolically marking the
arrival of a new government, the gesture of ideological inno-
vation makes it possible for citizens, at least to some extent,
to remodel the interaction between state and society: with
the state changing its political axis, the social actors are in
their turn potentially capable of interpreting this change as a
means of underpinning their own initiatives at local level.
Thus in Tangchi, since the abandonment of the multicultural
theme, it has been a question of building a “town model of
harmony.” This last term has the status of a watchword in
the Centre. Printed on all kinds of media, it is omnipresent
in texts that are distributed, to the point where some of them
have a confusing resemblance to pieces of official propa-
ganda. (34) Even more remarkable is the fact that members
wear, printed on the backs of their regulation jackets, either
the expression “A harmonious society, a land where ritual
and justice reign,” (35) or the litany “The harmonious society
begins with me, begins with my family, begins in Tangchi,
begins in Lujiang.” This approach of vestimentary display,
indeed of incorporation of the official slogan, raises ques-
tions. Is it simply a concession aimed at winning the favour
of the local government? Should one, in a more pessimistic
reading, attribute it to a form of voluntary servitude? Or
does it, on the contrary, testify to a canny pursuit of self-cho-
sen aims, in other words to make the slogan mean what the
government never thought it might one day mean? The truth
seems to us to lie precisely in the coexistence of these three
virtualities — to which must also be added the self-interested
use that can be subsequently made of it by local government.
Indeed, in this assemblage, it is the complexity of the dis-
positif that produces its viability and its durability: it makes
it possible for all of the protagonists to get what they want
without ceasing to display a belief in the aim of a communal
enterprise.
Thus, although the “harmonious society” claimed by the
Centre does indeed come from the slogan of a neo-Commu-
nist regime in need of social tranquility, it also contains an
experimental project in line with a real Confucian utopia.
Jingkong formulates a proposition on the problems of Chi-
nese society that is clearly political and inspired by national-
ism and anti-modernism. To him, Chinese culture, the fer-
ment of wisdom, is the most precious of all the world’s cul-
tures. Its vicissitudes are explained, in his view, by the fact
that “the teachings of our ancestors have been lost, forgot-
ten, and that we have begun to believe in foreign supersti-
tions.” Consequently, the Chinese must recover a sense of
“natural unity,” to which Western democracy is perceived to
be the precise opposite, but which Chinese single-party pol-
itics is supposed to favour, provided it undertakes a correct
selection of its elites according to the criteria of traditional
education. As Jingkong sees it, the Kuomintang failed in
1949 because its cadres had not been brought up in that
spirit. (36) Now, “It is on filial piety that loyalty to the father-
land depends (…); it is on honesty that the absence of cor-
75N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
33. The objective of building a “relatively well-to-do society” (xiaokang shehui) defined by
Deng Xiaoping referred back to the notion of “xiaokang” that stems from the Shijing and
the Liji (where it had the even more positive meaning of a “peaceable and prosperous
life”). Jiang Zemin also drew inspiration from Confucian discourse when he put forward
the principle of “governing the country through morality” (yi de zhi guo).
34. “In order to apply the proposal of President Hu advocating the building of a harmonious
society (…), and in accordance with the documents of the Council of State Affairs and
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (…), the Centre, basing itself essen-
tially on the teachings of our eminent traditional moral culture, sets the following peda-
gogical guidelines (…),” cf. Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin, Hexie shehui, Liyi jiabang:
Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin, p. 5. 
35. This phrase combines Hu’s slogan with a famous expression from the Liji.
36. See, in the DVD series Hexie zhengjiu weiji, part 7: “Tangchi: a model for the world.”
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ruption depends. [If members of the Communist Party] are
all respectful towards their parents, if they are all honest,
then there will be no better party in the world.” (37) However,
in the perspective of the “Old Professor,” it is not in the
CCP that salvation lies. Jingkong states that he nurtures the
hope, within ten years, of having cultivated 50 genuine
sages, that is to say “Confuciuses, Menciuses, Shakyamunis
of today.” (38) It is moreover with this aim that a deeper train-
ing step is offered to all those who have completed the ini-
tial six-month training. As Jingong says, “Since 30 professors
have been able in only a few months to transform a village,
why could we not change the whole of China? (…) It would
be enough to record the teaching of our 30 professors and
to broadcast it by satellite television: our country’s leaders
could listen, each in whatever place he was. In a year, all of
China’s problems would be solved.”
The fo rmation of  a “model”  undergovernment approva l
Bolstered by these vast aims, the experiment in Lujiang cor-
responds more concretely to the proposal of a “model” (shi-
fan). This claim to exemplarity at the local level presup-
poses the more or less active support of the district’s cadres.
We must distinguish here between two modes of extension
of this model, implying two types of government collabora-
tion.
At the moment, most of the Centre’s activity concerns the
local, in accordance with a scheme of progress from neigh-
bour to neighbour that recalls the traditional motif, crys-
tallised in the Great Study, of gradual spreading of local
beneficial effects up to the most comprehensive level. (39) “It
is harmonious families that by associating with each other
make a harmonious Tangchi; it is harmonious villages and
townships that join together to make a harmonious Lujiang.
What men have in themselves of harmony, of respect, of
peace, that is what lies at the source of the household, the
country, the whole world.” (40) It is this first mode of exten-
sion that dictates, for example, that after two months of in-
ternal training, the members of the Centre are invited to go
and meet the residents. The Dizigui plays a fundamental
role in this: the classic is to be read over the next three
years by all of the residents of the town, of the district, and
then beyond. To this end visits to neighbouring schools are
regularly organised, where classes in traditional art (calligra-
phy, painting, paper cutting, etc.) are also given. Even more
directly, the members of the Centre go so far as to visit peo-
ple’s houses in order to encourage parents to educate their
children according to traditional principles, and everybody
is to behave according to their status within the family.
Exercised on a moral level, this local proselytism is backed
up by discourse of a more political nature concerning the
image of the town. While its transformation into a “model
region” gradually imposes itself as a duty, it is also supposed
to be a source of pride for all. It is on this two-fold level that
the Centre’s activity comes within the scope of the official
horizon of the local government: not only is the intervention
of the members in the daily life of the town perceived as hav-
ing the government’s approval, but their cause is presented
as meeting the official objectives of enhancement of the dis-
trict. In other words, spreading harmony cannot but presup-
pose a solid harmony with the local authorities. And de
facto, the latter willingly support the undertaking from the
moment that all explicitly religious colouring is duly ban-
ished from it, and to the extent that they hope to benefit
from it themselves.
This support is even clearer when the Centre — and this is
the second means of spreading the “model” — sets itself the
task of seeking trans-regional channels that enable it to reach
individuals all over the country, which correlatively can only
increase the credit given to the officials. Such is the case of
lectures entitled “Building a town in Tangchi that is a model
of harmonious society,” which have been held periodically
since February 2006, and where there is talk of hundreds of
participants. Likewise, in May 2006, teachers from 260
kindergartens, primary, and secondary schools were brought
together in Tangchi for training. Finally the Centre’s present
leaders have been carrying out a major programme in the
Hainan prisons, naturally in close collaboration with the ad-
ministration. This entails, in direct connection with the local
provincial court, using traditional culture as a means of moral
reform aimed at making inmates aware of the gravity of their
errors: an approach that is officially known as “important ac-
tion in the reform of education in the prisons of Hainan
Province.” (41)
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37. Cf. Hexie jiuzhen weiji, part 4: The policy of the Royal Way: An ideal system with a view
to accomplishing harmony between Heaven, the Earth and Man.”
38. Cf. Hexie jiuzhen weiji, part 7.
39. Cf. Anne Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise (A history of Chinese thought), Paris, Édi-
tions du Seuil, 1997, pp. 72-73.
40. These remarks can be read on the first page of the Centre’s website.
41. Preface by Zhang Fa (Deputy Director of the Department of Judicial Affairs of the
Province of Hainan and Director of the Provincial Prison Administration) to a little book
published jointly by the Provincial Prison Administration of Hainan and the “Xiaolian Cen-
tre for Initiation into National Studies” in Haikou, directed by Yang Shufen and Cai Lixu:
Chanhui yu xinsheng: xuexi Zhonghua minzu youxiu chuantong wenhua ganwu. Fuxing
renyuan pian (Repentance and a new life: Studying and becoming aware of the eminent
traditional culture of the Chinese people. Writings by prisoners), 2007.
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Between everyday l i fe  and o ffi cial  sphere :mora lisation techniques
While it is referred to in the discourse of the Centre’s lead-
ers, the “harmonious” quality of Tangchi is not evident as an
objective fact. It can nonetheless be seen, if only by taking
note of differences from other more ordinary towns: the vis-
itor cannot avoid being struck by the remarkable tidiness of
the streets; struck above all by the discourse of the inhabi-
tants who, when questioned, are full of praise for the Cen-
tre and its action in the neighbourhood. This state of local
opinion is undoubtedly not uniform or permanent. It seems
nonetheless to be a result of the fairly systematic use of
“moralisation techniques.” We must here distinguish be-
tween several kinds.
First are the day-to-day interactions between the town’s resi-
dents and members of the Centre. Besides the salutation the
latter must address to any passer-by, they are also expected
to keep an eye on the tidiness of the streets. Now this two-
fold civic and environmental preoccupation is inseparable
from a form of incitement to good behaviour. According to
members of the Centre, certain residents of the town who
were at first indifferent or even hostile ended up feeling
“moved” (gandong) by so much altruistic zeal, and conse-
quently were subjectively obliged to participate in the work
of public cleanliness. A story that is quoted in several ac-
counts tells of how some “professors” went so far as to clean
the private toilets of some individuals, who had sought to test
them by making such a request before being deeply moved
by the gesture. Through this preaching by example a new
local order has gradually established itself in which the inter-
nal communal dimension becomes more and more substan-
tial in the minds of the town’s residents.
Another method concerns active collaboration with the gov-
ernment, from which the latter benefits in terms of image —
and sometimes financially. Thus the Centre has created a
system of rewards for virtuous residents, leading to the or-
ganisation of regular meetings that, according to the Centre’s
leaders, have the two-fold advantage of crediting social
morality and involving the local government in its promotion.
For example in January 2006, just two months after its open-
ing, the Centre seized the occasion of the Spring Festival to
award a “sum in token of respect for the elders” (jinglaojin,
amounting to 121,200 yuan) to all the town’s residents over
70 years old. To this end, a ceremony was organised by the
Centre during which this sum was handed over to 60 repre-
sentatives. This donation was not in any way financed by
public funds, any more than was the ceremony, which was
however officiated by the president of the town’s People’s
Assembly and numerous local cadres (42) (who expressed the
government’s “entire approval” of “the successes obtained in
the Centre’s work” (43)). The officials were not merely con-
tent to approve this activity, they also benefited from it di-
rectly: the ceremony was an occasion for the Centre to give
the town government the sum of 200,000 yuan as an “emer-
gency fund.”
Another aspect of these techniques for raising moral stan-
dards implemented with the support of the government con-
sists in the elaboration of an official framework for the as-
sessment of the Centre’s activities. Indeed, members con-
stantly refer to local government statistics as formal proof of
the significance of their action. The court figures thus
passed on indicate that in 2006, the Centre’s first year, the
divorce rate in Tangchi decreased by 48.5 percent, while the
police station’s statistics show a reduction of 47 percent in
the town’s crime rate. (44) Brandished in conversation, these
figures proclaim the legitimacy of a “model,” while at the
same time tending to insert it into the official work of social
pacification.
Governmental control, whether passive or active, symbolic
or economic, thus appears not only as a central mechanism
of the Centre’s action and influence, but also as an aspect
that is organised and even staged by the members them-
selves. If it is thus the case that the local government unde-
niably benefits from such an arrangement, is the simple word
“instrumentalisation” sufficient to explain its durability up to
now?
A new form of  governmentab il ity  based ona  co llec t ive  mode  o f  sub ject ivat ion
The Lujiang Centre confronts us with the paradox of an in-
strument whose founders claim certain aims that are “politi-
cal” in the broad sense of the term, but which functions by
working essentially on the level of morality. The politicians,
for their part, are involved in this dynamic, but are in no way
its promoters: it even seems sometimes that they are as much
instrumentalised by the disciples of Jingkong as they are in-
strumentalisers (the mention of the divorce rate — which is
in no way part of government priorities — in the statistics is
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42. Notably present were the deputy secretary of the District CCP, the head of the local Prop-
aganda Department, the deputy head of the district and the head of the district Educa-
tion Bureau.
43. Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin, op. cit., p. 11.
44. Zhou Yu, “Tangchi: Rujia wenha yu hexie xiaozhen” (Tangchi: Confucian culture and a
harmonious town), Minzhu yu fazhi shibao, 2007, n° 30, A01-02.
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eloquent in this respect). While the Center does indeed
exert a form of power, it is a matter of a “moralised” and
“moralising” power, in other words, based on an individual
capacity to integrate the norms of social regulation, and a
collective capacity to have them integrated (ideally up to and
including by the leaders). We are here, on a local level, in
what Foucault calls a space of “governmentality,” at the
point of “a meeting between techniques of domination over
others and techniques of self,” (45) thus totally external to the
liberal political model based on the rule of law. In fact, de-
spite the brandishing of legal statistics, it is not the sense of
the lawful and the unlawful that is cultivated in Tangchi, but
of the moral and the immoral, which is to say of a norm that
is supposed to prevail at all levels of social life, and is estab-
lished below the level of the law itself. Against the differen-
tiation between the moral and political spheres that is the
principle of the modernist reforms of the twentieth century,
and contrary to the various political and legal consciousness-
raising movements that can be seen to be developing today
in China (particularly around the “rights defence move-
ment,” weiquan yundong), it is at bottom a form of “ethical
government” that is tending to establish itself in Lujiang.
This new model appears clearly in the way in which, in col-
laboration with the Centre’s leaders, the project of moral ed-
ucation in the prisons is being applied. The Prison Admin-
istration Office of Hainan Province has printed an Anthol-
ogy of the Classics of the Eminent Cultural Tradition of
China (46) for the prisoners, which includes extracts from the
Dizigui. According to Lin Mingfen, Political Commissioner
of Prisons of the town of Haikou, the teaching based on
these texts has had the effect of bringing a number of pris-
oners back to a buried natural goodness, and consequently
to feeling genuine repentance. Apparently, an experiment
has even been carried out of releasing prisoners for a fixed
period of time to visit their parents in order to make an act
of contrition in front of them; all the prisoners are said to
have returned to their cells at the set time. (47)
What is remarkable here is that the “disciplinary discourse”
that shows its effectiveness in this way presents itself as to-
tally foreign to the law: it produces a discourse about the
norm that seems to interfere very little with the legal serving
of the sentence (the change in attitude of the convict, in this
case, does not lead to any reduction in sentence). Moreover,
in this context of Chinese culture being publicly and fer-
vently claimed, one can observe in a disarmingly pure form
a phenomenon that, while it often appears to be a common-
place of Chinese political history, (48) nonetheless constitutes
in this case the heart of the mechanism: the filial relation-
ship is not only the metaphor, but also the vector of the re-
lationship to power  — and at the same time its naturalisation.
The example of the convicts on furlough is instructive here:
the movement by which they testify tardily to their gratitude
towards their parents is the same as the one that confirms
them in their social status as convicts.
The strong effectiveness of this dispositif finally depends on
what one might call a “collective mode of subjectivation” in
which the most intimate and emotional realities (as in the
case of filial sentiment, rediscovered as innate but fragile)
become factors in communal cohesion. While this two-fold
movement can be found elsewhere in Chinese history and
society, the specificity of the Lujiang Centre is that it sys-
tematises it to the point of making it the heart of a local
arrangement and of an educational dynamic. Thus, to the
members in training whom we were able to interview, admis-
sion to the Centre corresponded to a radical change in atti-
tude towards their parents: they said they had gone from a
situation of ingratitude to a strong feeling of debt and recog-
nition (gan’en). Now this internal upheaval coincided with
leaving the family, and with commitment to long months and
even several years in a particularly demanding structure. Ap-
parently paradoxical, this approach can be well understood
once one perceives the Lujiang Centre for what it funda-
mentally is, which is to say, as we have shown, an establish-
ment devoted to the tradition of “natural” norms. Thus the
“emotion” that may be evident in the audience during a lec-
ture on filial piety  — an emotion that is shown on posters at
the Centre showing photographs of a smiling audience, but
also of a female listener in tears (49) — does indeed testify, in
a spontaneous way, to the value of a filial relationship for
one particular individual, but also to his or her insertion in a
community that is capable of talking about this value and
mediatising it. 
The emotion is thus controlled: it is part of a ritualised
framework (in this case, classes begin with a triple collective
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45. Cf. Michel Foucault, “Les techniques de soi” (Techniques of self), (1982), in Dits et écrits
II, Paris, Gallimard, 2001, p. 1604. 
46. Cf. Zhou Yu, art. cit.
47. Cf. Zhou Yu, art. cit.
48. Pierre-Étienne Will criticises some historians for mechanically adopting the classic par-
allel between imperial power and filial piety. In this particular case, it is not so much the
parallel that we emphasise as its effectiveness within a specific dispositif. Cf. Pierre-Éti-
enne Will, “Entre présent et passé” (Between present and past), preface to Philip A.
Kuhn, Les Origines de l’État chinois moderne (The origins of the modern Chinese state),
Paris, Édition de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1999, p. 23. 
49. This emotion also finds written expression in the publication of accounts by listeners of
their reaction to lectures about the Dizigui. Cf. Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin, Dizigui:
Xingfu hexie de rensheng yaoshi: Dizigui xuexi xinde (The Dizigui, key to a happy and
harmonious life: What its study teaches us) (undated).
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salutation to the image of Confucius that hangs at the end
of the room, followed by a collective rhythmic reading of the
Dizigui) that consecrates its communal value while limiting
its possible excesses. From this perspective, just as the con-
vict contentedly returns to his cell after having re-established
his link with his parents, intimate experience of the debt to-
wards one’s parents does not isolate one from the Tangchi
community, or from that of Lujiang, or from the country as
a whole; on the contrary everything here gives one to believe
that it is their very ferment.In  search o f  “harmony”:  What  k ind?
The Lujiang Education Centre is no longer the only one of
its kind: projects that claim it as a model range from the most
discreet initiatives to the most official undertakings. Thus, a
comparable experiment is being carried out in the district of
Qingyun (Shandong Province) where a huge “Academy of
Qingyun” has been founded with the mission of “spreading
traditional culture.” (50) Directly linked to Tangchi, this estab-
lishment has already on more than ten occasions sent repre-
sentatives of local government, schools, and companies to be
trained at the Lujiang Centre, while since September 2007,
professors from Tangchi have been going to Qingyun to ex-
change views with local government officials. (51) At the most
private and least visible level, the influence of Tangchi is
recognised among members of the still very small and more
or less clandestine education network of the “sishu” (home
schools). (52) At the most institutionalised level, the experi-
ment carried out by the Centre’s leaders in Haikou Prison
seems to be well on the way to spreading elsewhere: the
prison sent four staff to Lujiang for a short course in April
2006, and 40 cadres from the local prison system, as well as
from re-education through labour (laojiao), went to the Cen-
tre for a week-long session in April 2007.
In the face of this emerging network, while the native notion
of “popular Confucianism” is pertinent, one can see how im-
portant it is to specify its practical content. Indeed, the cohe-
siveness of the “movement” that one sees here lies less in its
attachment to one tradition than in the implementation of
this tradition within a specific framework. Rather than a sim-
ply “Confucian” discourse, it is a certain way of acting
through this discourse, of getting the attention of, and put-
ting in touch with each other, a range of actors, that brings
the actors together around this “model.” Confucian dis-
course exists elsewhere, in other configurations; but in
Tangchi and in its various off-shoots, a singular framework
ensures that this discourse takes hold in a singular way, in
spite of numerous heterogeneous factors that exist as much
at the internal level of an establishment as at the level of its
links with the rest of the network.
Thus, in the case of Tangchi, we have seen that the “Con-
fucianism” of the Centre was due to a Buddhist, and in fact
it has retained traces of this origin in certain details: as apart
from the monks who can be encountered in Tangchi, the
practice of vegetarianism and of contemplation before meals,
the valuing of celibacy, or even the fact of addressing non-
human creatures (53) verbally and in writing seem to point to
this permanence. Moreover, while it is undeniably “popular”
because of its insistence on practice and because of its exclu-
sive reference to the traditional literature of children’s educa-
tion, it is no less broadly “official” because of the role played
in it by the local authorities.
On the one hand, on a global level, positive appreciation
does not imply total allegiance: reservations have been ex-
pressed by Buddhist monks visiting Tangchi, (54) and by cer-
tain residents pointing out excessively rigid operations. But
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50. Cf. this establishment’s website: http://www.dfg.cn/gb/qingyun-net/index.html (visited
on September 10 2008).
51. A smaller-scale experiment is underway in the suburbs of Nanjing, in Jiangning, where
a couple, who are also in touch with Lujiang, have bought a site in order to set up a
“Centre for Cultural Education in The Tradition of The Sages.”
52. Cf. Guillaume Dutournier, Wang Yuchen, “L’enseignement des “sishu” en Chine contem-
poraine: enjeux identitaires, pédagogiques et politiques d’un traditionalisme éducatif”
(The Teaching of the “sishu” in contemporary China: Identity, pedagogical and political
issues in an educational traditionalism), forthcoming under the aegis of the Ateliers Doc-
toraux de Beijing.
53. The Centre has a small farming area, where a notice has been posted to the animal
world requesting with the greatest courtesy that “The Venerable Animal and Insect
Ladies and Gentlemen” not feed on fields other than those provided for them.
54. A monk whom we interviewed recognised the value of the Centre’s teaching as a foun-
dation course, while stating that it could not satisfy him as a basis for self-cultivation,
even from a simple lay perspective.
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Female listener in tears 
on the posters at the Centre.
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deeper down, the sharing of common references covers con-
siderable practical differences. Thus one must be aware that
the “harmony” of which members of the Centre speak and
that which structures political discourse do not mean literally
the same thing. The notion is firstly more often qualified as
“socialist” in official language, an adjective that completely
disappears in the context of Lujiang. Moreover, when the
government speaks of “harmony,” it does not seek to deny
(and the alarming character of official statistics (55) show this)
that the causes of disharmony are not moral but political and
social. The interpretation of Jingkong and his disciples is
quite different. However much they use statistics to confirm
their approach, these do not point to social conflicts, but to
the supposed improvements in the fengqi (atmosphere, qual-
ity of morals), the political problem in their eyes forming a
continuum with the moral problem. Finally, if harmony in
Tangchi is to be constructed, it is to some extent by going
back, since it is in fact conceived as depending on natural
norms, which an institution like the Centre is aimed at reac-
tivating. Given these differences, as well as the debates
around the notion of “tradition” in government circles, one
is not surprised by the fact that, despite certain enthusiastic
assessments, (56) some official voices have come out against
the pursuit of similar experiments. (57)
And yet what cements this diversity, what provides meaning
in the interweaving of these diverse internal components, as
well as in the feeling of shared belonging linking together
concomitant but completely uncoordinated enterprises, is the
reference to a single framework that has demonstrated its
practical and symbolic effectiveness in practice. In Tangchi,
people can believe in the consensual discourse of the author-
ities, since the word “harmony” functions as a link between
the global harmony that is supposed to mobilise the leaders
and the harmony that is confirmed in a ritualised everyday
life. People can believe in a general collaboration of individ-
ual goodwill, since “tradition,” far from shutting one into a
particular relationship, situates the experiment on a great
“Way of the Saints and the Sages” as impersonal as it is
open to adaptations, and since, moreover, the most local and
intimate action continues to draw approval from the deep
sympathies of the one culture and the one society that are
the very horizon of its symbolic effectiveness.
The success of such a “model” probably lies in the combi-
nation of unanimist fiction and self-cultivation, the former
providing a strong ideological framework and the latter com-
mitting the individual at his deepest level.
As evidenced by the adjustments that the model has under-
gone over three years, it is by trial and error and through the
give and take of veiled interaction with the authorities that
people have gradually and collectively become convinced of
its viability. In this sense, despite its strongly traditional
colouring, the future of the “Tangchi formula” remains open.
While it appears likely to spread, its future will probably be
played out between two different applications of governmen-
tality of which it has become the testing-ground, which is to
say, in short, between two practices of self-realisation in a
community context of unanimist discourse: the one could
continue to favour a form of social integration, while influ-
encing the political through a moralising approach; the
other, however, could prove to be purely disciplinary. (58) •
• Translated by Michael Black
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55. According to official statistics, between 1994 and 2004, the phenomenon of “mass in-
cidents” (which is to say demonstrations and attacks of all kinds against government
organs) increased by 22.2 percent a year, reaching 74,000 a year in 2004. The total
number of Chinese citizens involved in this kind of action has grown from 730,000 to
3.76 million. Cf. Hu Lianhe, Hu An’gang, Wang Lei, “Yingxiang shehui wending de she-
hui maodun bianhua taishu de shizheng fenxi” (Influence of social contradictions on so-
cial stability: Factual analysis of an evolution), Shehui kexue zhanxian, n° 4, 2006, pp.
175-185.
56. For example, a professor at the CCP Party Central School sees in the Lujiang Centre an
appreciable political experiment from the point of view of the Harmonious Society: he
compares it with what were then illegal innovations carried out by the peasants in Anhui
in 1977, which finally set off the process of agricultural de-collectivisation. Cf. Liu Yuli,
“Xiri Fengyang Xiaogang cun, jinzhao Lujiang Tangchi zhen – guanyu Anhui sheng
Tangchi zhen shuli zhengque rongruguan, goujian hexie chengzhen de diaoyan,” (Yes-
terday the village of Xiaogang in Fengyang, today Tangchi in Lujiang: Investigations on
the town of Tangchi in Anhui, where is being constructed a real sense of praise and of
blame, and where a harmonious town is being built), Fazhan daokan, n° 1, 2007, text
on line: http://zhexue.ccps.gov.cn/fzdk/dklm.sjyts/834.html (visited on 20 September
2008).
57. In September 2006, the Party Secretary of the town of Majing’ao (Hunan), inspired by
the model of Lujiang, began to promote the teaching of the Dizigui in the local primary
school. However, in April 2007, the head of the Education Bureau of the city of Jishou,
backed up by a group of 70 teachers and government officials, undertook an examina-
tion of the Lujiang Centre over three days and decided to stop the experiment in Ma-
jing’ao. Severe criticisms were aimed at the Centre’s practice of extralegal publication,
as well as at what were deemed to be its retrograde ideas and imposition of vegetari-
anism. As these cadres saw it, resort to traditional culture has to be done “in a critical
way,” which is to say, based on the versions of the classics for children revised by the
competent government authorities. Cf. Chen Anqing, “Xiangxi xiaozhen, yi chang liuchan
de “rujia zhizhen” shiyan” (The failure of a “Confucian experiment” in a small town in
Eastern Hunan), Xiaoxiang chenban, 17 May 2007.
58. A recent article in the press reveals that the Lujiang Cultural Education Centre was
closed in December 2008, a story confirmed by the local government. The reason for
this closure is at present still unknown, with the only explanation having filtered through
from a member of the local Education Bureau referring to a decision by the hierarchy.
However instructive it may be about the ambiguous attitude of government towards
phenomena of “popular Confucianism,” this sudden interruption of the Tangchi experi-
ment does not seem to imply — at least for the moment— the disappearance of the
mark it has made on local consciousness, or the end of its influence over its substitutes
and other initiatives that share the same inspiration. Cf. Pan Xiaoling, Wu Da,
“Likai ’Kongzi’ de rizi,” Nanfang zhoumo, 28 May 2009.
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Social experimentation and “popular Confucianism”
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Glossary
Cai Lixu 蔡禮旭
chuantong wenhua 傳統文化
Dazangjing 大藏經
Dizigui 弟子槼
duoyuan 多元
ertong dujing yundong 兒童讀經運動
Fang Dongmei 方東美
fengqi 風氣
gandong 感動
gan’en 感恩
guanfang 官方
guiding 規定
Hu Jintao 胡錦濤
Jian Fengwen 簡豐文
Jinniu 金牛
Jingkong fashi 淨空法師
jinglaojin 敬老金
Jingtu 淨土
jugong 鞠躬
Hainan 海南
Haikou 海口
hexie shehui 和諧社會
hongyang 弘揚
Kang Youwei 康有為
lao jiaoshou 老教授
laojiao 勞教
Li Bingnan 李炳南
liyi lianchi 禮儀廉恥
luoshi 落實
Lujiang wenhua jiaoyu zhongxin 盧江文化教育中心
minban feiqiye danwei 民辦非企業單位
minjian 民間
peiyang 培養
ren’ai heping 仁愛和平
rujia 儒家
rujiao 儒教
ruxue 儒學
shehuizhuyi hexie shehui 社會主義和諧社會
shidao 師道
sishu 私塾
Tangchi 湯池
weiquan yundong 維權運動
xiaodao 孝道
xiaoti zhongxin 孝悌忠信
xiushen 修身
xiuyang 修養
Xu Yehong 徐業鴻
xueru 學儒
xueshu 學術
Yang Shufen 楊淑芬
yigong 義工
